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As soon as the idea of sovereignty emerged as the organising principle of the 




 century, several political and legal 
theorists started grappling with its wider implications. For all its strengths, they realised 
that a system based on fully independent units could hardly provide a remedy to 
international anarchy. In the words of Thomas Hobbes, a “constant Peace” between two 
or more nations was out of question: “mutual fear may keep them quiet for a time, but 
upon every visible advantage they will invade one another.”
2
 
British thinkers offered a distinct contribution to this debate by envisaging a 
variety of arrangements aimed at restraining the power of individual states. Charting the 
evolving attitudes towards supranationalism held by the British peace movement, 
historian Martin Ceadel claimed that five different positions can be identified: the belief 
in international society, internationalism, confederalism, federalism and advocacy of a 
super-state. Proponents of the first two approaches maintained that states must act in 
accordance with certain norms, either due to social obligations or to a supposedly 
natural harmony of interests between them. Limitations of sovereignty, however, are 
meant to be minor, reversible and self-imposed. On the contrary, confederalists, 
federalists and advocates of a super-state alike made a case for constraints being placed 
by some external authority, even though they disagreed on which and how many state 
prerogatives are to be surrendered. According to Ceadel, it was not until 1914 that the 
British peace movement converted to confederalism, rallying behind the League of 
Nations after the First World War. Federalism gained currency between the late 1930s 
and the mid-1950 but the peace movement’s commitment to supranationalism vanished 
3 
  
in the following decade as the unfolding of the Cold War dashed hopes for a structural 
reform of the international order.
3
  
Largely following Caedel’s periodisation, this article sets out to explore how 
four left-wing intellectuals – Henry Noel Brailsford, G.D.H. Cole, Kingsley Martin and 
Leonard Woolf – came to embrace European federalism during the Thirties. Their tenets 
can be broadly defined as socialist. Their understanding of international affairs, though, 
was largely informed by the British progressive tradition, and therefore ‘progressive’ 
may be a more accurate term to categorise their views.
4
  
Even within the British context, these four figures were far from alone in 
applying the language of federalism to international politics. Ideas of federation can be 
traced back to nineteenth-century discourses about the future of the Empire and, perhaps 
more straightforwardly, to the Round Table movement, whose members advocated the 
establishment of an imperial federation in place of traditional colonial rule.
5
 Nor were 
Brailsford, Cole, Martin and Woolf the only progressives to argue for a radical rethink 
of the dominant approaches to international relations: from David Mitrany’s 
‘functionalism’ to E. H. Carr’s alleged ‘realism’, a variety of competing paradigms 
developed during the interwar years, and fuelled an ongoing debate about the nature of 




These four authors, however, provided a distinct and substantive contribution to 
this larger conversation. To begin with, from a theoretical perspective, they broadened 
the notion of federalism by incorporating the idea of a reorganisation of the 
international economic system into it. Drawing on Hobson’s theory of imperialism as 
well as on the more recent Marxist works of John Strachey and Harold J. Laski, these 
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intellectuals contended that, in the age of monopoly capitalism, big business had a firm 
grip on the political class and used state power to pursue a relentless quest for new 
markets which exacerbated international tensions.
7
 By the same token, they thought that 
any covenant leaving untrammelled laissez-faire in place within the economic sphere 
would fail to ensure a lasting peace. Unlike other non-socialist defenders of the League 
of Nations, such as Robert Cecil, they insisted that legal guarantees would not suffice to 
ensure a workable international system under capitalism, for these would sooner or later 
be jettisoned by the ruling class to serve the interests of industrialists and financers.
8
 In 
fact, a strong call for a transformation of both the domestic and the international 
environment permeates their writings: they believed – as another distinguished 
progressive, Bertrand Russell, put it in 1934 – that “complete anarchy is even more 
dangerous as between highly organised nations than as between individuals within a 
nation.”
9
 Planning – to be carried out at national as well as at supranational level, 
building on the Soviet experience – was the alternative method of running the economy 
that they envisaged, and almost uncritically endorsed.
10
  
Secondly, unlike other federalists like Lionel Curtis, these authors did not see 
the British Empire as a potential vehicle for a future federal order based on egalitarian 
and democratic principles.
11
 Rather, their work has a sharply anti-imperialist streak, 
which sometimes drew strength from first-hand experiences abroad: it is no accident, 
for instance, that Woolf became hostile to colonial rule while being employed as a civil 
servant in Ceylon, between and 1904 and 1911, and that Brailsford’s commitment to 
Indian independence was bolstered by a seven-week visit of the country in 1930.
12
 
Dislike for Empire had serious implications for the type of federation that these authors 
advocated. If it was unreasonable to expect that the British Empire would evolve into a 
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federal union of self-governing states, due to the inherently exploitative character of 
imperial control, then Britain’s best hope – so the argument runs – was to create a 
federation in Europe and join it. By and large, Brailsford, Cole, Martin and Woolf 
agreed that Western European countries, with their long-standing democratic traditions 
and fully developed industrial economies, provided fertile ground for a political and 
economic integration with Britain. Between 1930 and 1939, these authors outlined 
different federal schemes which, in their view, would ensure economic prosperity and 
consolidate peace, provided that socialist parties could resist the mounting tide of 
fascism and gain power to implement them. After 1939, they recast European unity as a 
key war aim to dispel fears of British decline and of a new Treaty of Versailles imposed 
upon the vanquished, although their benevolent attitude towards Soviet foreign policy 
and their ambiguous view of the role of small nations within a federated Europe led 
them to miscalculate about the chances of success of their vision.        
Obviously, in order to properly assess the significance of these ideas, it is 
essential to consider the circumstances under which they originated. British 
international thinkers who lived between 1930 and 1945 were forced to question the 
conventional wisdom of their times. Going through a period that has been fairly 
compared to a “dark valley”
13
, they faced two major, overriding historical 
developments: first, the decay of nineteenth-century free market capitalism whose 
golden age came to an end in 1914 and whose foundations were further eroded by the 
Great Slump; second, the breakdown of the League of Nations, as its members’ failure 
to cope with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, Italy’s aggression against Abyssinia 
and, above all, Hitler’s reckless Machtpolitik destroyed the credibility of collective 
security.
14
 It is under these circumstances that British progressives looked for a single 
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solution to what E. H. Carr would famously call “the two scourges”: mass 
unemployment and war.
15
 The fact that laissez-faire capitalism and the League plunged 
into crisis almost at the same time played a major role in making European unity so 
appealing to them. It is perhaps ironic that, during years marked by the early emergence 
of globalism as a new strand of international thinking
16
, these intellectuals discovered 
the virtues of regionalism: compared to far-reaching visions of a world Commonwealth, 
such as those sketched out by Lord Lothian and Curtis
17
, their schemes of international 
governance were less grandiose in size but more ambitious in purpose, as they assumed 
that, under British leadership, new political and economic institutions for Europe as a 
whole would be set up. In this sense, their position may be described as a tactical retreat 
from the utopia of a global order – which they saw as premature, albeit certainly 
desirable in the long run – in favour of a geographically circumscribed but deeper (and 
supranational) form of integration that could lay down more robust foundations for the 
former.  
It is finally worth stressing that the path through which Brailsford, Cole, Martin 
and Woolf espoused the cause of European unity is very similar. This, arguably, reflects 
the influence that they exerted on each other. The extent to which their lives were 
interwoven is indeed revealing. Martin, a journalist and former teaching assistant at the 
London School of Economics, co-founded The Political Quarterly with Woolf in 1930, 
and was appointed editor of The New Statesman one year later. In his memoirs, he 
recalled that Woolf had also “a powerful influence on the policy and character” of the 
latter journal and became “a Father Figure” for him while Henry Noel Brailsford turned 
out to be his “closest journalistic companion.”
18
 The relationship the three had with 





 Furthermore, they all came from the Labour Left’s interwar milieu: 
they were regular contributors to the New Fabian Research Bureau (NFRB), joined or 
had friendly contacts with the revived Socialist League at least in its early days (1932-
1933) and had direct access to the Left Book Club, whose nearly 60,000 members 
provided a remarkable audience.
20
 Martin’s friendship with Laski, who was his mentor 
at the LSE and set up the Club along with Victor Gollancz and Strachey, proved a 
valuable asset for the group: Gollancz’s was the publishing house which Brailsford, 
Cole, Martin and Woolf worked with more frequently.
21
 The fact that such a closely 
knit group of intellectuals managed to reach a high level of consensus on several issues, 
including the desirability of a European federation, is therefore neither accidental nor 
entirely surprising. Their approach, however, stands out as more consistently articulated 
than other progressives’ interested in international politics in the same period, which 
explains the decision to focus on them instead of covering a wider spectrum of figures 
from the same milieu.  
 
Reinventing the League, 1930-1938 ca 
  
Initially, plans for promoting European unity generated little enthusiasm among 
most left-wing intellectuals and a quick look at the views expressed on The New 
Statesman during the late 1920s and early 1930s confirm this. In fact, suspicion and 
scepticism surrounded federal schemes as well as regional cooperation in general. Most 
notably, Sisley Huddleston – a prominent commentator on foreign affairs based in Paris 
– warned against “the bargainings and groupings which are contrary to the spirit of the 
League”
22
, including the formation of a “European bloc” which may provoke “the 
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creation of other Continental blocs” and of Asiatic, American and British ones.
23
 
Furthermore, as he dismissed the “United States of Europe” as a “an excellent phrase 
which can be twisted to mean anything”, Huddleston urged the second Labour 
Government not to “put the cart before the horse, and imagine that a general 
proclamation will produce a condition of affairs which is belied by a hundred specific 
national rivalries, jealousies, ambitions, fears, and animosities.”
24
 In his view, a 
“diminished League, without juridic authority, without adequate powers, were it 
independent from the League” would be of no avail: at best, a “European section of the 
League” would enable “regional groups […] to deal with their own social problems” 
provided the latter would remain firmly under the authority of the Geneva 
organisation.
25
 Despite this concession, Huddleston repeatedly dismissed federal 
proposals as “dangerous” forms of “rhetorical diplomacy”
26
 and “fashionable babble.”
27
 
One of his favourite targets was the Briand Plan, which the editor of the New Statesman 
Charles Mostyn Lloyd poked fun at for not committing “anybody to anything, except, of 
course, to belief in moral unity” and for reaffirming “the everlasting principles of 
1919.”
28
 The same vein of cynicism surfaced in other pieces of commentary: for 
example, the French former Prime Minister Édouard Herriot’s plea for a European 
federation was denounced as “a stab in the back for the League which as universal 
organism in embryo is the only hope for humanity”, and brushed off as “old mental 
furniture” which had been “re-upholstered so as to give the illusion that it is up to date 
and expresses the spirit of the age.”
29
 Latent Francophobia, however, was not the only 
source of opposition to enhanced European cooperation. Scratching beneath the surface, 
deeper concerns about Britain’s standing as a world power can be detected. Tellingly, 
Huddleston laughed at the idea that the globe could be arranged “neatly and 
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diagrammatically in continents” as if Britain had “closer spiritual affinities with (say) 
Bulgaria than with Canada”, hence showing his attachment to the Commonwealth.
30
 
Lloyd spelt out the dilemma posed by French diplomacy in unambiguous terms: by 
endorsing Briand’s initiative, the British would find themselves with their hands “tied 
and one eye cocked outside in a way that would embarrass ourselves and others, and 
make us a perpetual solvent of the cohesion of Europe”; yet, by staying out, European 
unity “would be patently and seriously weakened.”
31
 To sum up, establishing a 
European federation would endanger not only the League’s framework but also 
Britain’s imperial commitments, a move that some New Statesman contributors saw as 
unnecessary – and even unwelcome.
32
 
Under Martin’s editorship the mood began to change as the shortcomings of the 
existing League became more evident and the ascendancy of nineteenth-century 
economic liberalism started to fade. To be sure, neither Woolf nor Brailsford – both of 
whom had drawn up blueprints for an international authority in 1917-1918, and had 
probably exerted a limited but not insignificant influence over the Paris Peace 
Conference of 1919– waited until the Thirties to express strong reservations about the 
post-war settlement.
33
  Woolf lamented that the League, far from engaging with self-
determination outside Europe, tolerated “national possession, ownership, or 
exploitation” in the Third World.
 34
 In addition to this, Brailsford – anticipating one of 
his favourite themes during the following decade – criticised the formalistic and 
legalistic character of the League, “its ignoring of the economic factor and its 
acceptance of the myth of the sovereign national state.”
35 
Even though he subsequently 
came to appreciate some of the initiatives taken in Geneva, he insisted that arbitration 
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and disarmament would not “solve the problem of war until we grapple with economic 
imperialism.”
36
   
The growing perception that the League was conservative in purpose weakened 
the rationale for the Labour’s pro-League policy pursued in the 1920s.
37 
At first, 
however, British progressives longed for its reform, rather than for its dissolution and 
replacement. In 1930 Woolf still argued that the League, despite its flaws, was “a 
visible rallying point and focus of internationalism and international organisation” with 
good chances of success, as long as an adequate “communal political psychology” took 
root: Woolf’s thesis rested upon the assumption that individual states were to blame for 
the lack of progress in establishing a workable international government.
38
 Three years 
later, however, he had to admit that the “whole system of international co-operation and 
pacific settlement” was “in the utmost jeopardy.”
39
 In his view, the rise of Hitler, the 
invasion of Manchuria and Britain’s disengagement with continental affairs originated 
mainly from the lack of a general disarmament policy.
40
 The ultimate responsibility for 
the decline of the League, therefore, lay with “the governments of the Great Powers and 
to the peoples who send nationalist governments to Geneva.”
41
 Nevertheless, Woolf 
also stressed that the League had been undermined by economic turmoil, and held that 
the problem of peace required a twofold solution: “(1) an ordered transition from the 
individualist capitalist economic system to some form of communal or socialist 
economic system; (2) the evolution of an ordered international system regulating the 
relations between States and preventing war.”
42
 Moreover, a future Labour government 
could not neglect the fact that fascist states were sabotaging the League from within, by 
disregarding its provisions: a “more militant policy” was therefore necessary to “use the 
League itself as an instrument against Fascist militarism.”
43
 Woolf suggested that 
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Germany might be pressured by a Labour government “to comply with its obligations 
under the Covenant or openly to repudiate them”, being forced to leave the 
organisation.
44
 In Woolf’s view, this would not necessarily be a negative outcome since 
“a League, purged of militarist and Fascist states, composed of democratic and socialist 
governments, determined by every means in their power to prevent war, would be a 
much stronger instrument for peace and civilisation than the half-sham League which 
we have today.”
45
 Woolf’s argument is especially interesting because, for the first time, 
he hinted at the possibility of a League with a reduced membership.
46
 
According to Brailsford, however, expelling fascist powers from the League was 
not enough for the machinery of the latter was fundamentally inadequate. In a sombre 
picture painted in 1933, he proclaimed that “the League may, if it cares to exert its 
power, prevent war or stop it, but it cannot cure the political or economic maladjustment 
that drives nations to war.”
47
 In fact, “the existence of the League may be a positive 
mischief if it blinds the mass of mankind to the fact that the real work for the 
banishment of war has yet to be done. And that may be our case to-day.”
48
 Here an 
important difference can be spotted. While Woolf understood war as a complex and 
multifaceted process, whose key cause was social psychology, Brailsford saw it as a 
direct consequence of capitalism, and therefore dismissed the idea that federal unions 
between non-socialist states could bring about peace. By the same token, he held that a 
domestic transition to socialism was a necessary precondition for a successful reform of 
the international system.
 49
 On these premises, Brailsford criticised the Labour Party for 
failing to acknowledge that “in the world of to-day peace can be assured and 
disarmament effected without any changes in its social and economic structure.”
50
 
Brailsford’s unmitigated hostility to state sovereignty as a capitalist deceit lies at the 
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core of his pamphlet If We Want Peace (1932) as well as of his lengthier book Property 
or Peace? (1934). Despite being originally conceived as “the international analogue of 
the obsolete police state of the eighteenth century”, Brailsford conceded that the League 
had gradually undertaken new tasks, becoming the embryo of “an organised 
International Society” and developing “organs of the social consciousness to which the 
Sovereign State must bow.”
51
 Nonetheless, he added that a full transition to a co-
operative international order was impossible until the notion of sovereignty was fully 
transcended. In the long run, only a world federation based on “the abandonment of 
sovereignty in all matters of common concern” and centralised control over armaments 
as well as production would be compatible with that “vision.”
52
  
Among British progressives, Brailsford was arguably the most consistent in 
using the language and the concepts of federalism to highlight the inadequacy of the 
League. It was not, however, the only one. Although Cole wrote mostly on international 
economics in this period, several of his writings pointed to the danger that unrestrained 
national planning could be used to curtail international trade and promote economic 
nationalism.
53
 In turn, these concerns led Cole to underscore the potentially destructive 
role of unfettered sovereignty during the Depression. “The fundamental weakness of the 
League of Nations, as it exists at present” he wrote in 1933, in a book co-authored with 
his wife Margaret “is that it is based upon a full recognition of the absolute 
independence and sovereignty of the States composing it, or at any rate of the Great 
Powers which in practice dominate its activities.”
54
  Cole was adamant about the 
necessity of lying down different foundations for an effective international governance: 
“There is in the last resort no halfway house between absolute sovereignty and the 
recognition of a supra-national authority with the right to issue decisions upon which 
13 
  
individual nations are under an obligation to act […]. As long as States continue to 
insist upon State sovereignty they cannot agree to the creation of a super-State.”
55
 In the 
meantime, he urged socialists to campaign for pacifism and internationalism, in the 
hope that an ever-increasing number of countries would refuse to use force to settle their 
disputes. Cole also believed that conditions were ripe for a “a European federation 
powerful enough to take over from the separate States the administration of many vital 
services, while leaving to each individual country a degree of autonomy amply 
sufficient to safeguard its special national needs.”
56
 He criticised the Briand Plan for 
prioritising political over economic cooperation but, like Brailsford, he maintained that 
a shift in domestic public opinion was essential: “if Socialism is able peaceably to 
conquer power in each of the great States of Europe, it will be possible for Socialist 
Governments to turn the League of Nations from what it is now into an effective organ 
of collaboration, or to create within it a real European union having this object.”
57
 The 
relationship between a future European federation and the League was not clearly spelt 
out but the fact that Cole’s book was highly praised by Martin as “authoritative, lucid, 
and objective” suggests that, within the progressive intelligentsia, a more positive 
attitude towards European unity was emerging.
58
 
Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia, in late 1935, further discredited the League as 
Britain’s and France’s lack of resolve in deterring Mussolini demonstrated that 
sanctions could easily fall flat. Moreover, the leaking of the Hoare-Laval Pact, by which 
the two countries acquiesced to Italy’s demands, proved that the Conservative-led 
National Government was only formally committed to collective security.
59
 The 
outcome of the crisis outraged progressives who felt themselves “spectators and 
participants in a long drawn-out struggle between two different methods of organizing 
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relations between states, the method of violence and war and the method of settlement 
and agreement.”
60
 Their judgment was drastic: even the usually prudent Woolf 
concluded that the League had been “killed” by the great powers’ refusal to carry out 
their obligation under the Covenant.
61
 The only option left to socialists, therefore, was 
to promote sub-groupings which could successfully halt fascist aggression. According 
to Wolf, “an alliance of France, Britain, and Russia against Germany, Japan, and 
probably Italy” was the only viable alternative to capitulation.
62
 This policy, in order to 
succeed, had to be “prepared to satisfy all legitimate grievances by fascist states, but 
also to oppose them in any attack”: it therefore needed to be backed up with rearmament 
if necessary.
63
 Then, in the medium term, this anti-fascist “peace front” could evolve 
into “the nucleus of a resurrected League”, as long as the great powers managed to 
regain the trust of the small states: “the time may come again in which the wider 
security system of the League can be re-established. But for the moment, if we wish to 
prolong the breathing space and lay the foundations of peace, we must begin by basing 




Martin insisted on the importance of organising the new grouping as a federation 
from the outset, for the League had to be “revived not only as a genuine instrument for 
peace, but also as an organ for removing the causes of war.”
65
 Writing on recent 
developments in airpower, he expressed his wish to see national forces abolished, civil 
aviation turned into “a world public service”, and peace kept “by an international 
authority.”
66
 Nonetheless, similarly to Brailsford, he thought that “no super-national 
authority to control and international police force” could be created “without a 
revolution in thought and social structure in every capitalist country.”
67
 By 1936, Martin 
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was convinced that a narrower League was inevitable: “If there ever is peace in the 
world it will be achieved by a closer union of States whose Governments believe in 
their own profession”, overcoming the framework of a “a loose confederation of 
Sovereign States, each pursuing its own interests, without any close ties of economic or 
political co-operation.”
68
 Establishing “an honest League of like-minded States, within 
the present League of quarrelling sovereignties” was a desirable aim for Labour in 
power, although the long-term objective that he set was for more ambitious: “Just as the 
federated Sovereign States of America were forced by threat to their existence to 
become the United States of America, so some day, sooner or later, probably not until 
their economic basis is changed, the sovereign States of Europe, if they are not to go 
down together in universal ruin, will have to become the United States of Europe.”
69
 
The idea of a new League within the League was articulated in greater detail by 
Brailsford, whose retrospective assessment of the chances of success of the Geneva 
organisation had become increasingly severe, especially after the Spanish civil war 
exposed the hypocrisy of non-intervention as practiced by the British National 
Government.
70
 Having become convinced that “the League was lamed in its cradle by 
the character of the peace settlement which drove America into isolation, by the 
exclusion of Germany and by the several alliances which the French contracted”, 
Brailsford claimed that disentangling it from powerful vested interests had been 
impossible, and under a right-wing Franco-British leadership it was bound to remain 
“an alliance to maintain the balance of power and the present situation of economic 
opportunity.”
71
 Pushing Woolf’s and Martin’s arguments a bit further, he even 
recommended the Labour Party to pursue a policy of “vigilant detachment” from the 
existing League until in opposition and then build a “Federation of Socialist and like-
16 
  
minded States” with the USSR as chief partner when in power.
72
 Brailsford further 
developed his thesis in Towards a New League (1936), where he liquated the existing 
League as a “functionless fifth wheel on the chariot of history that spun ineffective in 
the air” and restated his previous arguments in favour of a federal solution.
73
 He 
clarified that any upcoming grouping could not “be upon a universal scale. It will have 
to start modestly, among like-minded States and it must content itself with a limited 
geographical area” but be equipped with wide economic powers.
74
 This “Inner League”, 
like to the one envisaged by Woolf, would “enter the field of reality from the moment 
that a victory of the Left in our own country made it possible to group Britain with 
France and the Soviet Union.”
75
 Brailsford’s confidence in France as a reliable ally was 
presumably bolstered by the success of the Popular Front in 1936, which many 
progressive intellectuals saw as a breakthrough for socialism.
76
 In the following two 
years, Cole, Brailsford and Martin all toyed with the project of a British People’s Front 
capable of defeating the National Government at the polls, achieving power and 




Turning Europe Upside Down, 1939-1945 ca 
 
Since the early 1930s, progressives had been wishing that the peace movement 
could ‘defeat fascism without war’, to use Martin’s recurring formula.
78
  In 1938-39, 
however, the issue of rearmament came close to driving a wedge between those, like 
Woolf, who never gave much credit to a policy of disarmament and unilateral 
withdrawal from world affairs and those, like Martin, who feared that militarisation 
could pave the way for an authoritarian government in Britain and therefore did not 
17 
  
write off alternative courses of action, such as a seeking a diplomatic settlement with 
Germany which would also cover colonial matters.
79
 It is no accident that the New 
Statesman and Nation’s reaction to the Munich agreement was a mixture of “immense 
relief” for the disaster averted and “anxiety” for the fate of the crippled Czech state, left 
to the mercy of German troops.
80
   
Non-military options were soon to be superseded by events. In an article 
published about four months before the invasion of Poland, Martin suggested that a new 
general war was only a matter of time as society had already “fallen into the clutches of 
people who believe in war as an instrument of policy and can only think of progress in 
terms of conquest.”
81
 To his mind, the roots of the disaster dated back to 1918-1919 
when Britain, France and Germany had not emulated Russia in abandoning capitalism: 
“The task was to build an international society, and that meant to achieve Socialism 
within the great States, to develop the League, since that was the only instrument to 
hand, and to educate the public into international habits of thought and inoculate it 
against national propaganda. All these things had to be done together.”
82
 For the future, 
he stressed once again that “the only hope does rest in international Socialist 
federation”, and that sticking to a “rational goal” would help people to “keep their eyes 
fixed on the practical means for its realisation” while going through the ordeal of war.
83
 
As the conflict finally broke out, Martin insisted that The New Statesman and Nation, 
whom he still edited, would aim at reaching out to “people who want to go on thinking 
during the war and in particular will want to think of the future.”
84
 This involved a 
careful examination of war aims, which could not entail the restoration of the status quo 
ante: “There is, as we have seen in recent years, no possible solution of the problems of 
Europe on the basis of strategic frontiers, economic self-sufficiency, customs barriers 
18 
  
and national armaments; the only hope lies in a federal solution. We must not talk of 
national disarmament, but of a central police force. We must not talk of a League of 
sovereign nations, but of economic institutions devised for the public service of Europe; 
we must talk not of self-determination, but of a federal government and cultural 
freedom for the various people.”
85
 Whatever compromises a new peace settlement 
would require, the creation of an International Authority which, “groping, pioneering, 
experimenting” would “have the power to lead us all in the direction of a planned 
international economy” was indispensable.
86
 Arguably, Martin’s wholehearted espousal 
of federalism was also driven by the conviction that most ordinary Germans would not 
fight to the last ditch, and a British endorsement of a post-war Federal Europe could 
undermine domestic support for the Nazis.
87
 The message certainly resonated with the 
leader of the Labour Party, Clement Attlee, who, in November 1939, famously declared 
that “Europe must federate or perish”, within a speech whose language and key 




Progressives seemed to agree that war, for all its sheer destruction and violence, 
could at least severe ties with the old order, both in domestic and international affairs.  
Brailsford was the most fervent supporter of this approach as he warned that, without a 
commitment to the establishment of a European federation “including the German 
people liberated by revolution in the hour of defeat”, Britain would be involved “in yet 
another struggle for imperial power, and another effort to fetter and dismember the 
German nation.” 
89
 In his view, “creating at least the nucleus of a Federal Union in 
Europe” outstripped “self-preservation” as the paramount war aim for the United 
Kingdom.
 90 
In a pamphlet written in 1939, he even sketched out the basic institutional 
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framework for the future federation, whose main features would be monopoly over 
defence, a dedicated international civil service to administer former colonies and 
extensive powers to regulate and manage all sectors of the economy, including the one 
to “to legislate by a majority vote than can over-ride the egoism of sectional and anti-
social interests.”
91
 Brailsford envisaged “a council devoted to planning” with the power 
of submitting legislation to a Congress composed of two chambers, a Senate whose 
members were to be appointed by national governments and a “popular House” 
democratically and directly elected.
92
 A Federal Court would also be set up, although 
Brailsford, influenced by the American experience, warned against the dangers of a “too 
rigid Constitution and an omnipotent Supreme court.”
93
 Resuming Woolf’s original 
idea, he claimed that “the Federation must reserve the right to suspend or to expel a 
Member-State for any grave or repeated offence against the Constitution.”
94
 Externally, 
a European Federation would “cultivate close and cordial co-operation both with the 
U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.”
95
 Interestingly, by late 1939, Brailsford no longer held that a 
domestic transition to socialism was a necessary step to achieve this type of federation: 
in retrospect, he found his previous position “too pessimistic” and noted that some 
federalist proposals had already “made progress, even among conservatives.”
96
 Besides 
that, he was more positive about London maintaining a close partnership with 
Washington: although he doubted that the United States would ever join the war, due to 
a non-interventionist public opinion and opposition from Congress, he speculated that, 
through American financial aid, Britain could still “take the offensive” and liberate 
Europe from Nazi occupation.
97
 Nevertheless, in his view, special relationships were no 
substitute for federal commitments. As a matter of fact, he regarded any loose Anglo-
American union or, even worse, a reformed Commonwealth as grossly inadequate 
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frameworks for the post-war order: “The New Community cannot dispense with some 
central representative organ which deliberates and decides.”
98
 
Woolf’s and Cole’s approach to European unity was less systematic than 
Brailsford’s, albeit no less emotional and occasionally spirited. On the one hand, Woolf 
was busy defending the legacy of the League from its detractors, including E. H. Carr, 
who too easily dismissed it as “the casual failure of an academic dream brought up with 
a jolt against the hard facts of life.”
99
 On the other hand, he continued to stress that 
“international social-democracy”, namely the “equitable control and distribution of 
wealth between the communities or states just as between individuals, and a real 
international control of the potentially devastating power now in the hands of national 
states and their governments” was still “the corollary of national social-democracy”.
100
 
Under these premises, he concluded that “while it might be possible to develop the 
federal system for parts of Europe, it might at the same time be necessary to combine it 
with some kind of League system for the whole.”
101
 The key obstacle, however, was 
neither economic nor political: federalists could not “walk round an overwhelming crux 
by ignoring the psychology of nationalism which is the outward and visible sign of state 
sovereignty.”
102
 Compared to other progressives – with the notable exception of 
Mitrany –, Woolf was quite pessimistic about the chances of making a “colossal leap 
forward” in the immediate post-war period due to the resilience of nationalist feelings, 
and predicted that “federal unions” would remain “small and limited.”
103
 In the long-
run, however, economics would pull “towards international organisation, to world 
planning of production and distribution”
104
, and his attitude towards regional groupings 






Cole’s federalism was perhaps more enthusiastic but also more erratic 
throughout this period. In 1939-40, his views closely resembled those of Brailsford, 
Martin and Woolf.  Like them, he was concerned that the British would be perceived as 
“the champions of decaying capitalism against the new forces of the twentieth century”, 
had they stood for the established social order and for the Empire.
106
 Yet he was also 
confident that, by fighting for a “federal solution” rather than for restoring “the ‘balance 
of power’ in Europe”, Britain would regain prestige.
107
 Unlike the League of Nations, 
which was too extensive” and not “intensive” enough, Cole predicted that the future 
“New League” would be equipped with a central authority having the power to 
“override State law” and be open to all states from “Western and Central Europe.”
108
 A 
European bloc would then be able to reach an “agreement” with the United States, the 
Soviet Union and Japan.
109
 He was also adamant in linking successful national planning 




Nevertheless, following the Nazi invasion of the USSR in August 1941, Cole 
began to display – to put it mildly – a “sympathetic tolerance” for Soviet territorial 
claims over Eastern Europe.
111
 Having become convinced that, by joining the Grand 
Alliance, the USSR would play a major role in reshaping in the international order and 
enhance the European socialists’ chances of success, he went so far to say that he would 
“much sooner see the Soviet Union, even with its policy unchanged, dominant over all 
Europe, including Great Britain, than see an attempt to restore the pre-war States to their 
futile and uncreative independence and their petty economic nationalism under capitalist 
domination. Much better to be ruled by Stalin than by the restrictive and monopolistic 





At one level, Cole’s remarks demonstrated little knowledge of and strong 
prejudices against Eastern Europeans and were met with criticism from a few other 
socialist authors.
113
 Yet they also highlighted two major weaknesses in the progressives’ 
understanding of international politics and conception of European unity – weaknesses 
that had been latent before 1939 but which the war fatally exposed. The first was the 
naïve view of the Soviet Union as an advocate and practitioner of multilateralism in 
international affairs – an attitude that had been certainly strengthened by Stalin’s 
acceptance of collective security and the Comintern’s endorsement of Popular Fronts in 
the crucial period 1934-38. By welcoming the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, 
Cole thought this would not entail the imposition of Soviet institutions on those 
territories but would instead pave the ground for supranational governance, since the 
creation of one or more European federations would fulfil Soviet security needs in the 
region.
114
 Even Woolf, who was far from blind to the deeply authoritarian character of 
the Soviet regime, genuinely believed that the USSR would agree to submit itself to an 
“International Economic Commission with very extensive powers” entrusted with the 
task of carrying out the reconstruction of Continental Europe.
115
 Not even after the 
Potsdam conference would this benevolent interpretation of Soviet foreign policy be 
entirely abandoned.
116
 The second weakness was a lingering ambiguity about the role of 
small powers, and minorities more generally, in the post-war settlement. Woolf and 
Brailsford, for all their criticism of absolute sovereignty, were not insensitive to claims 
of self-determination and feared that a world order dominated by great powers, other 
than setting the stage for a new war, would fail to safeguard the legitimate rights of 
small nations and minorities.
117
 On the other hand, Cole regarded national self-
determination in the political realm as obsolete and therefore opposed the restoration of 
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state structures that the Nazi occupation had swept away.
118
 At a deeper level, one could 
argue that, whereas Woolf, Brailsford and probably even Martin expected the European 
federation to be established on a voluntary basis, Cole saw it almost as historically 
inevitable, and speculated that the birth of a European bloc would put Britain in an ideal 
position to mediate between the United States and the Soviet Union.
119
 If anything, this 
conceptual confusion alone reveals how supple and easy to bend the notion of 
‘federation’ had become. 
These differences, however, were made practically irrelevant by wartime 
developments. In April 1944, Martin still expressed confidence that “a new type of 
federalism”, combining the Western “tradition of freedom” with the “modern efficiency 
of Soviet socialism”, could thrive in Europe after Britain and the USSR had found 
“common ground.”
120
 But in mid-1945 much of his optimism about the maintenance of 
a smooth and constructive relationship between the USSR and the West had 
vanished.
121
 In fact, one of the worst nightmares of the progressives – a Europe “divided 
sharply into two spheres of interest, one dependent on Moscow, the other on 
Washington and London”
122
 – began to unfold. Under this scenario, not only the 
“bisection” of the Continent would nip the European federation in the bud but Britain 
ran the danger of becoming a satellite of the United States as Anglo-American 
cooperation could degenerate into a “new form of imperialism.”
123
 Interestingly, during 
the last two years of the war, ‘European federation’ came to symbolise a supranational 
system of Continental governance which would not involve the permanent occupation 
or the dismemberment of Germany. Thus, the only viable solution to the German 
problem – Brailsford held – lay in a supranational arrangement, in conjunction with the 
socialisation and internationalisation of Germany’s heavy industries.
124
 Cole, fearing a 
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punitive peace treaty, also recommended the internationalisation of the Ruhr as this 
would prevent Germany from “re-arming for a new world war”, although he remained 
silent about the broader framework under which this could happen.
125
 Woolf similarly 
pointed out the need not to exclude the vanquished from the future security system, 
highlighting the danger that the United Nations could become a self-appointed 
“exclusive club of peace-loving states or ‘good boys’ with all the incorrigibly ‘bad 
boys’ outside the pale” – a conception that could foster further divisions and hostility.
126
 
However, as the Cold War loomed, European unity gradually lost impetus among most 
progressives, despite their enduring refusal to support a peace settlement similar to 
Versailles’.  This presumably reflected a wider disenchantment with an international 
setting which, due to the mounting tensions between East and West, left little room for 
the far-fetched schemes of international governance that these thinkers had contributed 





   
Peter Wilson convincingly argued that a ‘New Europe’ debate took place in 
Britain between 1941 and 1944 as a wide-ranging group of thinkers discussed the 
repercussions of the war on the Continent, the role of the United Kingdom in the 
forthcoming reconstruction, the position of Germany and the most desirable institutional 
framework for a fair and sustainable European order.
128
 Although the outbreak of the 
conflict certainly made some of these issues more compelling, this article has pointed 
out that the progressives’ fascination with European unity dated back to the early 1930s, 
when the dual crisis of laissez-faire capitalism and of the League of Nations shook the 
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foundations of their worldview. Brailsford, Cole, Martin and Woolf found, or hoped to 
find, an antidote to chaos, decaying capitalism, resurgent nationalism, fascism, 
imperialism, and war in regional integration, and projected their ideals onto an imagined 
community called European federation. A heavily emotional charge is present in their 
writings, sometimes at expense of analytical clarity. Mark Gilbert is certainly right, 
therefore, in contending that most left-wing intellectuals “did not so much to articulate a 
sophisticated understanding of how Europe might be organized as express a passionate 




Nor was this the only limitation in their contributions. As this article has pointed 
out, progressives severely misunderstood Soviet foreign policy and were remarkably 
ambiguous about the fate of once-independent states in Eastern Europe under the new 
federal system, wavering between respect for the principle of national self-
determination and ruthless Realpolitik. Furthermore, one can argue, in retrospect, that 
their penchant for sweeping solutions led them to set out their proposals in a way that 
could hardly win over sceptics from the moderate Left. In 1945, the kind of European 
unity cheered by the progressives required a swift rehabilitation of Germany as a unitary 
state, a departure from the great power politics underpinning the Grand Alliance and a 
shift in priorities from the Commonwealth to Continental affairs. None of these 
developments – as Michael Newman convincingly argued – were seen by the Labour 
Party leadership as particularly desirable, casting pro-European voices into 
wilderness.
130
 By presenting European unity as a radical break with the past rather a 
sober and pragmatic undertaking in line with British national interest, progressives 
probably did more harm than good to the cause they were championing. 
26 
  
The value of their work, however, lies elsewhere. Theoretically, Brailsford, 
Cole, Martin, and Woolf challenged the heavily legalistic approach to international 
security of early IR theorists and practitioners such as the members of the Bryce Group 
as well as the moralistic idealism à la Alfred Zimmern.
131
 Although their understanding 
of economics was often rudimentary and based on a second-hand knowledge of 
Marxism, the efforts made by the progressives to grasp how economic relations affected 
the functioning of the international system were genuine – and pioneering. By rejecting 
a formal conception of sovereignty and delving into the interplay between economic and 
political factors in international politics, they increased the range of issues and 
phenomena which international relations theory is supposed to engage with and 
explain.
132
 The fact that the debate on the nexus between capitalism and war is now 
regarded as “the major split on the left in the English-speaking world” during the 
interwar period is revealing about the impact of their thinking.
133
 
Furthermore, historically, their reflections marked a significant shift in the focus 
of discourses about Britain as an international actor, as these had been previously 
monopolised by advocates of a more or less reformed British Empire and unflinching 
defenders of the League. Progressives still felt strongly about the need for some degree 
of global governance, and by and large did not see global and regional cooperation as 
mutually exclusive.
134
 However, by embracing a nuanced form of regionalism and 
tentatively drawing a path towards a commitment to Europe by their country, they 
boldly addressed some of the awkward dilemmas that British policy-makers and public 
intellectuals faced after the end of the Second World War, including the status of Britain 
within a bi-polar world.
135
 Their answer was overoptimistic, as progressives seriously 
underestimated the resilience of pre-war state structures after 1945, and, at times, 
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surprisingly neglectful of the constraints under which politicians – socialist included – 
operated. Yet these authors deserve some credit for not succumbing to pessimism and 
for articulating an original, dynamic, and not entirely unrealistic set of responses to the 
collapse of the global order that they witnessed. Last but not least, one could certainly 
praise, in retrospect, their steadfast allegiance to peace and internationalism. Their 
retreat from the global was, after all, inspired by the will to safeguard those very values 
that the League of Nations, albeit imperfectly, had sought to affirm. 
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